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IS THERE A PINK SLIP IN YOUR GENES? 
J.B. SILVERS1 
 
Actually, at my age and my genetic predisposition, I can’t see my nose.  With the 
introduction, I obviously am supposed to be an insurance company person here, but I 
have to put my economist hat on as well, so I’ll try to play both of those roles.   
On the insurance company side, it’s clear that insurance companies are not well 
loved by folks.  They’re not even supposed to do that.  At one point after a company 
had approached QualChoice and told us not to tell the enrollees something that, in 
fact, had been a policy decision by the company, I was suggesting that perhaps we 
should change the name to the company to the “Scapegoat Insurance Company,” 
since that really was what we were being paid for, and I think in this argument that 
may be part of the issue here.   
I was also thinking of the analogy for how to structure my comments, and 
Kathleen [Engel] did an excellent job.  I’ll build on some of what she has said, and 
the analogy that I thought of was really profound, a metaphor for our times, Harry 
Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone.2   
Now, since you have no reaction to that, probably most of you have not seen 
Harry Potter.  You probably think it’s a kid’s story instead of a metaphor for life as 
we know it.   
Harry Potter was a poor orphan who had this great power but didn’t know it and 
had to contend against forces of evil to try to obtain the Sorcerer’s Stone, which was 
a source of great power, and the reason he was able to obtain this stone is that he 
intended to protect it but not use it for his own gain.   
So the question is who gets to play Harry Potter in this little drama.  First of all, it 
is surely not the lawyers.  We know that.  It’s not the insurance companies either.   
So part of the question I want to ask is who is Harry Potter?  The forces of evil 
are, most of us would like to believe, or many of us might believe, the insurance 
companies, but let me argue that’s probably not the case.  It’s more of a system issue.   
The stone, however, of great knowledge and power is genetic information in this 
analogy.  That the potential for very good things or very bad things clearly rests in 
terms of this topic for the day.  Let me tackle five different things in the time I’ve 
got.  One is, what is it that makes health insurance work?  Kathleen [Engel] has 
made a good job of introducing that and I’ll just pick up on a couple of more points.   
Secondly, what do insurance companies need to do deal with the issues, to deal 
with the pitfalls in particular?   
Third, how can genetic information change all of this?   
Fourth, how does this, in fact, threaten, I would argue, the very basis of health 
insurance?  So we need to think about it.  And fifth, what do we do about all of this?   
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Well, first of all, this seems self-evident when you think about it, but insurance 
companies have to, insurance events have to be random among individuals, but 
predictable on average.  If you think about it, that’s obviously what insurance has to 
do.  So we have to have random events.   
Predictability however has to be good enough to avoid excessive premiums for 
risk bearing, that the amount the insurance company charges beyond the underlying 
costs is a function obviously of how much risk there is, and to the extent that we 
make them bear more risk, it costs.  So there’s an issue of predictability.   
Third, that enrollees need to match the general population or we have the 
problem she’s mentioned of adverse selection or positive selection if it’s the other 
direction.   
The actions of the insured, fourth, need to not be biased by the fact they have 
coverage.  That’s a concept of moral hazard, which hasn’t been mentioned this 
morning, but is a fourth issue you need to worry about.  
And fifth, that parties have to have access to the same information to make a 
market work, the market-based concept here.   
By the way, I have to throw in parenthetically, Kathleen [Engel] is married to an 
economist who is one of my colleagues at the Weatherhead School, so I am very 
impressed with your economic information.  I think that being with Jim so much has 
clearly rubbed off, you should know.  When you would actually use marginal costs 
and marginal return, I was very impressed.  I wouldn’t even do that in this day.  
Now, the problem of adverse selection, moral hazard and asymmetric 
information, the third one is that both parties have to have access to the same 
information.  If one has more information than the other, then you have the trouble.  
Clearly those conditions are never met.  The question is, how well are they met in the 
insurance market, and, again, what impact does this have?   
Well, if you take those three building blocks, which she’s introduced, what do 
insurance companies do to avoid that?   
First of all, as adverse selection is obviously the issue, one of the approaches to it 
is to try and make sure the group sizes are large enough that, in fact, you can have an 
average.  So if you have enough people in a group, then you tend to have a good 
average and it tends to work out.   
That’s a problem when there are many choices, when an employer offers, as Case 
Western Reserve University does, four or five different plans, there’s an issue 
because people that are healthy, as she mentioned, will pick the lower risk or the low 
cost plan, and people that are sick will pick the high coverage plan, tending to drive 
the two to extreme.   
Moral hazard, what do insurance companies do about that?  Well, co-pays and 
deductibles and risk sharing of various sorts are ways to deal with that.   The 
asymmetric information is important for us, and the trouble in the past is in many 
cases that the individual knows more about their own health information than the 
insurance company.   
So insurance companies have resorted to preexisting condition clauses in their 
contracts and limitations on the amount of time that they’ll write a contract so that 
they have an “out” over a period of time, and number two, they have resorted to re-
insurance, so that if something untoward happens, I can lay that risk off on another 
company or some other source that will pool it better.   
2001-02] IS THERE A PINK SLIP IN YOUR GENES? 17 
Both of these take away from the true insurance concepts, so we have less 
insurance, less pure insurance when we have short contracts and only exclude certain 
conditions.  So those are fundamental building block questions.   
To the extent that insurance companies do, they try to reduce the risk.  Fire 
insurance companies go in and inspect for fire conditions.  It’s not surprising that 
you would do that.  If you can reduce the risk of the event, then obviously the costs 
go down and people don’t look for insured things to happen.  
How do you do that in healthcare?  Well, things like preventing tests, if you can 
do that, credentialing, monitoring quality, using data to enforce proper care paths.   
The best example of that probably is United Healthcare maybe two years ago did 
a quick study of their database, very simple thing to do, and looked at all of the heart 
attacks that they had experienced across the country.  It’s a very large health plan, 
and looked at the use of beta blockers after that event, clear indication, and found, I 
think, do you remember, I think it was like 60 percent or 70 percent of the cases were 
actually using beta blockers when it should be 100 percent.  The Doctors were 
flabbergasted.  They had no idea that they were off the standards that much. 
Physician care is not always what it should be, and to the extent that insurance 
data can be used to help out, that can be a very positive thing.  A potential here, 
clearly a potential for use of genetic information to try to do something more 
positive, if there’s a pre-existing condition that you can’t exclude, then perhaps you 
can do something to eliminate the risk.   
Parenthetically, one of my mentors here, the fellow that actually established Blue 
Cross of Ohio many, many years ago, John Mannix, died a number of years ago.  He 
used to joke that there were two things that insurance companies definitely did not 
like to do.  One was to bear risks, and the other was to pay claims.  Now, he was 
over-stating it just a little bit, since that’s the nature of the business.   
But the predisposition to try to avoid things that, in fact, affect you negatively is 
undeniable, and I think that’s part of the trouble.   
Now, how could genetic information affect all of this?  First, I think positive 
selection or adverse selection of populations could happen in either direction.  Right 
now, I would argue we tend to probably have it geared more towards selection of 
possibilities from the patient.  Patients know a lot more about themselves, employees 
know a lot more about themselves than the insurance company does, and that the 
response of insurance companies’ negative response in terms of exclusion of 
preexisting conditions is definitely not a socially positive thing to have happen.   
But on the other hand, the other underlying condition and concern here is that if 
insurance companies got a hold of this, they can exclude people more effectively.  
Therefore, we need to worry about that.   
I think the question is, is that the problem with asymmetric information; that is, I 
know something that you don’t know, could be made more extreme by the use of 
genetic information.  That if I know a lot more than you do, then I really have a 
problem.  Right now I don’t know very much more than you do, but if I know a lot 
more than you do, then I got a problem.  The marketplace won’t work right.   
And then I think this, in fact, leads to a fundamental problem in terms of — 
secondly, knowledge, I’ve lost my point, knowledge of pre-existing or predisposition 
can be very positive, as Kathleen [Engel] had mentioned, if, in fact, there’s 
something you can do about it.   
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The benevolent long-term insurance company clearly would want to use 
predisposition of a future event as a marker to try to avoid the negative consequences 
of that.   
The problem, of course, is that insurance companies don’t write policies for long 
periods of time and they tend to have a short time horizon.  So, therefore, the positive 
parts of that are very unlikely to happen and that’s a problem.   
That leads to the crux of the whole difficulty that I think we’re facing here.  The 
very basis of health insurance is threatened, not just by genetic information, but by 
the whole tendency of where medicine has moved.  The very nature of health 
insurance is at risk when events aren’t random, and what we are moving towards is a 
time period where many fewer events are random and many more are predictable, 
particularly with chronic care conditions.   
To the extent that the population, and much of our health expenditures are tied to 
chronic care conditions that happen over a long period of time, events are no longer 
random, they’re predictable, and once they’re predictable, then the whole thing 
changes.  Events and expenses of individuals read in groups now can become more 
predictable, and, therefore, less insurable in the pure sense that I talked about before.   
The good part is that as more is known, as Kathy [Engel] mentioned, hedging 
necessity of risk bearing becomes less, and the cost of insurance should go down in 
the aggregate.  The trouble is, it’s going to be insuring the wrong people.  The task 
then becomes less insuring the unknown than in financing known patterns of care.   
This is a fundamental difference, because that’s not what we’ve asked insurance 
to do in the past.  This becomes an issue, particularly as she mentioned in cross-
subsidizing the care to one now known population with high known costs with over-
charging others with unknown, but probable low costs.  So the crux of all health 
insurance is basically the risk by the situation that we’re talking about.  
So the question is now, thanks a lot, what do you do about it.  Well, let me 
suggest something.  First of all, acting like the information doesn’t exist is foolish, 
especially when it can be used to improve life and the quality of life and avoid future 
costs and pain.   
There’s no question that we need to use the information, the question is how.  
The trouble is that the information will inevitably lead to further market failures in 
the insurance market.  I don’t think there’s any question about that.  It will make the 
market much more difficult, as it is now structured, as high cost ongoing care is 
squeezed by employers who want to minimize the cost.   
The bottom line is that conventional insurance is unsuitable for this kind of cross-
subsidy.  It won’t work, because it is usually handled by governmental means, not by 
competitive markets.  Competitive markets simply won’t be able to deal with this, in 
my opinion.  
The governmental means are one, taxes.  We tax certain parts of populations and 
subsidize others.  Don’t expect insurance companies to do that, or we also then, and I 
think this is less preferable, engage in regulation of the behavior of firms.  You must 
insure everybody, you must somehow cross-subsidize, and that will be less likely to 
work as mechanism in this particular market.   
The alternative to either one of those, taxation to pay for these ongoing 
predictable conditions or financing them rather than insuring them, is to strengthen 
the re-insurance market, to take known risks away from conventional insurance 
leaving them to cover only the random events that I mentioned before.   
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Then my company could go to the government re-insurance for excess cost of 
those enrollees with certain conditions in exchange for a modest premium.  The 
government or the larger entity could then pool and actually still make an insurance 
market work leaving the conventional market to work for truly random events, 
addressing the underlying problem of predictability of that population, which I think 
is a very serious one.  Then we can finance care for known populations of people at a 
higher level than the insurance market, but still be pooling for and have the potential 
to do good things in terms of delivery and use of information without the affluent 
problem of adverse selection at the insurance market.   
Alternatively, I’m just thinking about this morning, alternatively, we could dump 
the whole thing.  So I don’t know if there are any UHCAN people here.  There are 
always around Cleveland.  This may be the Achilles’ heal of the whole system, you 
can go to a single payer system dealing only with financing and ignoring the fact that 
we have to have insurance, skipping the whole insurance part of it and simply paying 
for anything.  Perhaps, in fact, genetics will accomplish what politics and economics 
could not, and now we have insurance companies that neither have to bear risks or 
pay claims.   
Well, Harry Potter, where did we wind up?  It seems to me that the question is, 
how do we do something that, in fact, is going to do the right thing and make a go of 
it.  I don’t see lawyers, as I said before, as Harry Potter, the one who is trying to do 
the right thing and can use this information properly.   
Doctors can do it.  Doctors, in fact, have a right, and I think they’re closer to be 
the right party to use this information, because obviously they make the right kind of 
decisions.  But I also would probably argue that the patients are the ones who 
ultimately have to be responsible for this information in terms of making the 
decisions.   
The evil force is not the insurance company.  The insurance company is simply a 
mechanism to spread risk, to do some financial things that we need to have in 
society.  The evil force is the system and the fact that systems don’t change very fast.   
The question is, how can we create a framework, which is why I think the law 
exists and why government needs to worry about these sorts of issues, that lets us 
make the right sets of decisions, but lets these parties make the right sets of decisions 
so that, in fact, the stone of power can be done positively.   
AUDIENCE:  I’m not sure that I have a clear picture about what the state of 
medicine is right now, and you mentioned that there were 40,000 genes and we don’t 
even know what they are.  
Are we at the state right now scientifically where if you did a study, an employer 
of 10,000 employees, that you could accurately predict what was going to happen 
[inaudible] five years to that population?  I mean, are we there right now? 
DR. ZAHKA:  Thank goodness that Dr. Wiesner is actually shaking her head no.  
She’s the geneticist, I’m just a cardiologist.  She’s the keeper of all of this 
knowledge.  
AUDIENCE:  Dr. Zahka, are your patients concerned about genetic 
discrimination?  Is that something that your patients regularly bring up to you?  
DR. ZAHKA:  Not yet.  I think that will evolve.  I was actually thinking about 
how to ask Professor Silvers about the issue about who should, in fact, be Harry 
Potter?  Like most physicians, I think I spend an enormous amount of time educating 
my patients and their family, and I think I’m enormously successful.  I’m not sure 
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that most of them are going to be able to understand the world of genetics right now.  
Ten years from now?  Twenty years from now?  Thirty years from now?  Maybe.  
But I mean, there are people like me who barely understand it because I have a 
great colleague like Dr. Wiesner, but I think to take that leap right now to the 
families and the patients is going to be really tough.  
But I think Georgia [Wiesner, M.D.] should address that as well, because she’s 
much closer to it than I am in terms of people who are really focused on it, because 
people who are focused on it are generally, are at her door. 
COMMISSIONER MILLER:  The way that I think about it is that we’re at this 
very odd and whacky historical moment, and going back to your question about the 
state of medicine, we have the ability to learn a lot of genetic information, but for the 
most part, there’s really no therapeutic use for knowing that information.  There’s no 
reason to know if you have particular markers one way or the other for the most part.  
There’s some good health preventative stuff, but there’s not really the wholesale 
genetic therapies out there yet, and, therefore, in a sense this information becomes 
particularly dangerous now to be poking around and so on.  
There’s a tremendous amount of future expectations and hope, that this genetic 
information will ultimately turn into health-related therapies in which, years from 
now when my daughter is my age, these discussions will seem very trite and obscure 
because the way medicine may be practiced, the way that genetic information is 
going to be integral with respect to both responding to disease and preventing disease 
may be vastly different.  
So we’re trying to build this protective bridge and bubble, recognizing some real 
issues, but also not really seeing around the corner to where medicine is going and 
how this is going to ultimately play out, and that makes it really very complicated 
and difficult, but nonetheless, very important to do.  
Because I believe that if we don’t get the proper protections in place, while the 
medical advances won’t be stopped, it certainly will be slowed down dramatically 
because people, out of fear of discrimination or fear of privacy concerns, are not 
going to be willing to engage in the kinds of testing to open themselves up to 
research protocol to participate in the science moving forward.  So it really is a 
complex interrelated bubble. 
